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Abstract
Nowadays, climate change is an overwhelming threat to 
many people who live in the planet. As a result, countries 
signed the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and held rounds of 
negotiations to curb the increasing temperature. Under the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ 
in Kyoto Protocol, the responsibilities of developed 
countries were emphasized. This situation changed in 
2007, when China overtook the United States to become 
the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world. China is 
criticized for being the culprit of the over-emitting carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere and is required to shoulder 
the main responsibility of cutting emissions in post-
Kyoto era. However, these blames and requirements are 
unfair to china and hamper the economic justice of china. 
This paper is intended to analyze the impact of climate 
negotiations on economic justice of china from three 
different aspects: The right to development of China, 
Emission transfer and China’s export-oriented industry 
and Injustice China encounters under Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM).
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UNFCCC -- United Nations Framework Convention on 
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INTRODUCTION
In this day and age, climate change is an overwhelming 
threat to many people who live in the planet. As a result, 
it connects the globe through environmental, political and 
economic ties. In order to curb the increasing average 
global temperature through joint efforts, countries 
signed the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the “Rio Earth Summit” 
in 1992. It is the first convention in the world that 
aims to reduce the negative impact of climate change 
on human society by comprehensively controlling the 
greenhouse gas emissions, especially reducing the carbon 
dioxide emission. Also, it is the basic framework to cope 
with climate change issue through intergovernmental 
cooperation in the international community. 
As a non-binding convention, however, UNFCCC 
can only “encourage” countries to reduce the greenhouse 
gas emissions. To assure the provisions’ effectiveness 
and enhance the global response to climate change, in 
1995, they launched the first round of negotiations in 
Berlin, Germany, whose official name is first session 
of the Conference of the Parties (COP 1). Two years 
later, at the COP 3, the delegates from 149 countries 
and districts adopted the Kyoto Protocol. Holding the 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, 
the Kyoto Protocol  placed a heavier  burden on 
industrialized countries concerning emissions reduction. 
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37 industrialized countries (Annex I countries) commit 
themselves to reduce gas emissions and all member 
countries make general commitments. “At negotiations, 
Annex I countries (including the US) collectively agreed 
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% on 
average for the period 2008-2012.” (PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency, 2011) Under the 
Protocol, three market-based flexible mechanisms help to 
reduce the annual emissions to the level of the basic year 
1990: emission trading (ET), joint implementation (JI) 
and clean development mechanism (CDM).
By 2005, the Kyoto Protocol officially came into 
force. In the same year, at COP11, Montreal Action Plan 
was hammered out to negotiate future agenda after the 
expiration of Kyoto Protocol in 2012. A panel named 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) was 
established to discuss the emissions reduction of Annex I 
countries in the second commitment period. Also, it was 
the first time that some rich countries began to complain 
about the zero-target-demand of large developing emitters 
as China, India, South Africa and Brazil (BASIC) in the 
Protocol. The complaint voice became more louder in 
2007 since China overtook the United States to become 
the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world. After 
that, tremendous attention has been brought to China in 
the following talks. In the meantime, various blocs of 
countries began to take shape and politically haggle in the 
arena of climate negotiations for the post-Kyoto regime 
arrangements. According to the similarity of interests 
and stances, there are 4 major influential groups: non-EU 
industrialized countries group consisting of nations like 
USA, Canada and Japan, which shows great reluctance in 
making any binding commitment; the 15 member states of 
EU group, which intend to lead the climate negotiations 
and profit from their guiding position; the newly-
industrializing countries group like China and India, 
which is in an embarrassed position with the need to emit 
large emissions and the moral responsibility to reduce it; 
the last group is G-77, which consists of the Alliance of 
Small Island States, the Least Developed Countries Group 
and the African UN regional group.
For the purpose of constructing the Post-Kyoto regime, 
in 2007, COP 13 of UNCCC drew a future roadmap at 
Bali and scheduled to finalize a binding agreement about 
Post-2012 arrangements before 2009. Also, the special 
panel Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action (AWG-LCA) was set to negotiate the more 
extensive cooperation among all countries, especially 
aiming at United States and developing countries (non-
Annex I countries). AWG-KP and AWG-LCA are legally 
separate but politically intertwined (Dimitrov, 2010). 
They offer a two - track approach in future negotiations. 
The successful but insufficient roadmap Bali Action Plan 
focused on four pillars: mitigation, adaptation, technology 
and financing. (Peter Christoff, 2008). These four pillars 
are the basic components of a Post-2012 Agreement and 
all have a long-standing effect on developing counties, 
particularly on China. By 2009, COP 15 was held in 
Copenhagen to fulfill the Bali Roadmap’s goal - a 
framework for a binding agreement after the expiration 
of Kyoto Protocol should be agreed there. However, 
the distinct divergences in interests among participant 
countries, especially the sharp split between China and 
United States over the 300 billion climate fund, doomed 
the failure of COP 15 from the very beginning. While 
the world’s attention was justifiably on Copenhagen, 
the conference perhaps produced the most ambiguous 
outcome in diplomatic history, leaving governments 
and observers alike wondering how to assess the result. 
(Averchenkova, 2010; Egennofer & Georgiev, 2009) 
The Copenhagen Accord can only “take note of” issues 
like the importance to hold the rise in global temperature 
below 2 °C.
Despite the waterloo of Copenhagen Summit, in 2010, 
people pick up their confidence again in COP 16/Cancun 
Conference, which produced the Cancun Agreements.
Though conf l ic ts  be tween BASIC and non-EU 
industrialized countries still exists, the basis of the world’s 
largest effort to reduce GHG was introduced and the most 
comprehensive package to help developing countries cope 
with climate change was included in the Agreements. 
However, a solid foundation did not sufficient enough to 
resolve all the political issues concerning the evolution 
of Post-Kyoto regime. Also, some answers to key issues 
remained unknown. For example, the exact number of 
emission reduction for Annex I countries and how to 
subside the CDM program in developing countries was 
unclear. One year later, in 2011, COP 17 was held in 
Durban. The outcome of Durban Conference was a deal 
better than no deal: only securing a consensus to a legally 
binding treaty, the Durban Platform, to be prepared by 
2015 and to take effect in 2020. Another progress is the 
establishment of Green Climate Fund for implementing 
the Cancun package. For the first time in the history of 
climate negotiations, Durban Platform brought developing 
countries like China and India in the treaty.
Reflecting the marathon process of UN climate change 
negotiations, it is little wonder that the contents for the 
talks are definitely not only “environmental”; in the view 
of Realist, they have indispensable relations with the 
economic future of a nation and every country wants to 
maximize their benefits. As a result, the justice, especially 
the economic justice, will be badly threatened in the 
climate negotiation game. China, due to its prominent 
economic development, rising national power and large 
amount of GHG emissions since 2006, has been put in the 
center of censures by developed countries in the climate 
debates. These censures have a substantial impact on 
the economic justice of China. This paper is intended to 
analyze the impacts mentioned above.
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1.  OVERVIEW OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
D E B AT E  C O N C E R N I N G  C L I M AT E 
NEGOTIATIONS
In order to critically analyze the impact of UNFCCC 
negotiations on China’s economic justice, it is necessary 
to have a review of the fundamental debates around the 
climate negotiations. Politicians have difficulty to reach 
an agreement on whether to negotiate one or two climate 
change agreements (Dimitrov, 2010). Specifically, it is 
essential to figure out why some researchers insist on a 
two-track approach and argue that developed countries 
should carry the primary responsibility of climate change, 
while others, in particular scholars from Japan, Russia and 
Canada, try to find excuses to escape the Second Kyoto 
Protocol Commitment Period (KP-CP2) unless the two-
track approach became a single one - only the AWG-LCA 
exists and China shoulder the major responsibility for the 
recent GHG emission. 
Generally speaking, the fundamental debate is about 
who is more responsible for reducing the carbon dioxide 
emissions, to what degree and what to do with: “policies 
for mitigation (i.e., reducing GHG emissions), adaptation 
(to the consequences of climate change), and financing 
and technological support for developing country actions” 
(Dimitrov, 2010) since the arriving of KP-CP 2 in recent 
UNCCC negotiations. Developed countries and BASIC, 
especially China are the major arguers in the global 
climate governance stage. 
Some researchers insist on a two-track approach 
because this approach respects the common but 
differentiated responsibility principle and respective 
capabilities under Kyoto Protocol. That is, the two-
track approach emphasizes developed countries’ role 
in combating climate change problem. After all, it is 
an indisputable fact that developed countries, notably 
USA, Japan and EU, have produced the largest share 
of historical global carbon dioxide emissions during 
the industrializing period. Because it is those CO2 
accumulated in the atmosphere that results in the global 
warming, developed countries own an environmental debt 
to developing countries and have the obligation to pay 
off their debt by providing funds and resources to tackle 
climate change problem.
Other scholars (especially those from non-EU 
industrialized countries) prefer a single approach -- 
demanding a single global treaty containing all major 
emitters in the world to entail a long ratification process 
(Dimitrov, 2010). By doing so, they underscore the role 
of China in the global labor division of mitigating. Due 
to the rapid industrialization and the unprecedented 
economic growth since 2000, large amounts of energy 
consumption are required in China, resulting in a dramatic 
increase of its GHG emissions. In 2007, based on the 
analysis of fossil fuel consumption and cement production 
data, China was reported to surpass USA with 1.6 billion 
metric tonnes in 2006 as the world’s largest total annual 
emitter (Figure 1). According to 2009 datas from the US 
Energy Information Administration, the top 4 total annual 
emitters of fossil fuels CO2 are: China: 7,711 million tones 
(MT) or 25.4%; US: 5,425 MT or 17.8%; India: 1,602 MT 
or 5.3%. Some analysts even project that “in 2021 China 
will have larger cumulative CO2 emissions than Western 
Europe, and in 2052 China will surpass the USA as the 
largest cumulative emitter” (Botzen, Gowdy & Van Den 
Bergh, 2008). These analysts also argue that the emission 
peak in China will largely determine when the world 
emission would reach its apex and it is this expanding 
amount of emissions that leads to the climate change.
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Figure 1
The World Carbon Emissions and Top 6 Emitters 
During 1980-2008 
Source: Drawn on International Energy Statistics
2 .   ARGUMENTS REGARDING MY 
QUESTION
After reviewing the fundamental debates of the climate 
negotiations, I find that the crux of the disputes steadily 
involves with China’s economic interest. This section 
will analyze its impact on economic justice in China. 
Specifically speaking, due to the interwoven relationship 
between carbon dioxide emissions and economic 
development, China’s right to development will be 
undermined if emissions limits are put on China. What 
is more, since China is an export-oriented country, the 
emission transfer from developed countries to China 
through global supply chains consists of a large percentage 
of China’s total emission. Besides, the application of clean 
development mechanism seems to bring more benefits to 
industrialized countries, rather than China.
2.1  The Right to Development of China
Restraining carbon dioxide emissions to some extent 
means to cut the energy use and even cap the speed of 
development, however, emphasizing development right 
of China does not mean put more weight on economic 
growth over the climate protection.
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To clarify the greenhouse development right in 
climate-constrained world, knowing the definition of it 
is necessary. Some scholars from EcoEquity (Baer & 
Athanasiou, 2007) and from Stockholm Environment 
Institute (Kartha & Benedict, 2007) define the right as 
a development threshold. It is a right of ‘a modest but 
dignified level of well-being’. (Baer et al., 2007) Below 
this threshold, individuals must be allowed to prioritize 
development, which means a country need to keep the 
basic living standard of its people before cutting the 
excess emissions.
In terms of responsibility, although people should not 
be bogged down in history, the large amount of historic 
emissions from developed countries cannot be ignored. 
Dating back to 19 century, when Industrial Revolution 
started, significant emissions have already been cumulated 
in the atmosphere due to the overuse of fossil fuel and 
natural resources. According to statistics of cumulative 
emissions of the period 1900-2004 from World Resources 
Institute, the US has the biggest historical share with 
314,772 million metric tonnes (MT) of carbon dioxide 
and accounts for 28.5% of the world total emissions. 
Germany consists of 6.78% with 73,625 MT and the UK 
makes up 5.73% with 55,163 MT. This unsustainable and 
barbarian way of production and consumption contributed 
tremendously to the economic growth and national power 
strength of industrialized nations. Although the current 
emissions of rich countries are much lower than China, 
the historical cumulative emissions of developed countries 
are much higher than China and it is these historical 
emissions that lead to the prosperity of developed 
countries. However, every country in the world should 
have an equal access to natural gas, coal and petroleum 
despite of the time and space. China is experiencing 
what developed country went through decades ago, its 
rapid expanding of industry and economy are inseparable 
with the use of natural resources and certain amount 
of carbon dioxide emission. If economic justice exists, 
setting limitation on emission of China at its economic 
taking off period is against its development right because 
industrialized countries all perform the same action during 
the same developing period.  
In terms of capacity, despite the overall economy of 
China is increasing at an unprecedented speed, it still 
faces numerous challenges that inevitably results in 
carbon emissions. The vast landscape, large population 
and unbalanced development among regions of China 
determine poverty reduction as China’s top priority. 
According to China sustainable development strategy 
report of 2012, there are 128 million people still lived 
under the poverty line, which determines the intensive use 
fossil fuel as the growth model in rural area. On individual 
level, if burning fossil fuels is the only available means 
for a person to keep warm or meet other important needs 
(which are constitutive of a ‘modest but dignified level of 
well-being’), the right to development implies that they 
have a right to burn fossil fuels (Harris, 2011). Also, the 
2008 data from Energy Information Agency shows that the 
per capita emissions of China is 4.91 million metric tones 
(MT), much smaller than US (19.18 MT), Canada (17.12), 
Russia (12.29 MT) and Germany (10.06). What is more, 
China is on its way of optimizing economic structure and 
using the energy more efficiently. The Medium and Long-
Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China 
was issued in 2007 to promote energy conservation and 
mitigate climate change. 
Under this circumstance, it is unfair to shift the blame 
of the excess missions in the atmosphere to China and 
it is unjust to compel China cut its emission and make 
commitment for quantified absolute emissions reduction. 
It will violate China’s naturally unalienable right to 
economic development as developed countries did in 
the Industrial Revolution Period. China has voluntarily 
dedicated itself in the cause of using environment-
friendly renewable energy and developing energy-saving 
technologies, but it will defend its development emissions 
and survival emissions. Its low overall consumption level 
and relatively small capacity simply defines one thing: 
Poverty eradication and internal energy security are 
always the priority of an emerging country as China.
2.2  Emission Transfer and China’s Export-
Oriented Industry
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) accounting rules, mitigation only applies 
to greenhouse gas emissions taking place within national 
territory where the country has jurisdiction (Eggleston, 
2008). However, in recent decades, especially since 
1990s, our globalizing international community became 
interwoven than ever before. International trade among 
countries makes the economic connection between 
nations become so inseparable. A territorial-based 
emission accounting system under fragmented mitigation 
architecture, nevertheless, overlooks these economic 
ties among countries, which may lead miscalculation in 
allocating future mitigation tasks. The stabilization of 
emissions in developed countries and increasing amount 
of emission in industrializing countries could be a false 
impression. In other words, the carbon footprint of a 
country is deeply affected by its industrial structure and 
its relationship to the global economy.
Since China opened itself to the outside world in 
1978 and entered the WTO in 2001, China has achieved 
great economic development through export-oriented 
industrialization. Figure 2 indicates the growth trend of 
Chinese exports. In 2009, China even surpassed Germany 
and became world top exporter. According to Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany, German exports amounts to 
$1.1 trillion in 2009. In the mean time, data from National 
Bureau of Statistics of China reported that Chinese 
exports amounted $1.2 trillion in 2009.
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Figure 2
The Export and the GHG Emissions in China from 
1980 to 2008 
Source: Drawn on International Energy Statistics and Chinese 
Statistics Bureau
Among the astronomical amount of Chinese exports, 
many goods fell into the category of energy-intensive 
industry. In the decentralized global supplying chain, 
developed countries situate in the top of the pyramid 
with cutting-edge technology and sufficient capital, 
while China lay at the bottom of the chain, producing 
manufacture-processing commodities of high energy-
consumption, large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions 
and low added economic value. According to China’s 
Customs Statistics, the top 10 export items in 2009 are: 
Iron and steel, ships and boats, vehicles, inorganic and 
organic chemicals, optics and medical equipment, power 
generation equipment, furniture, electrical machinery and 
equipment, footwear and apparel. These carbon-intensive 
products are exported to other countries, especially 
industrialized countries, for their domestic consumption. 
China’s Customs Statistics also shows that China’s major 
export destinations in 2009 are European Union ($236.21 
billion), United States ($220.82 billion) and Japan ($97.91 
billion), which altogether accounting for 46.2% of 
Chinese total export. Obviously, these countries and areas 
use offshore manufacturing and export from China to hide 
their carbon flow.
Now that the positive relation between export of China 
and green house emissions are clear, attributing the excess 
missions only to China is unjust. Actually, Weber et al. 
(2008) find that in 2005, 33% (1,700 MT) of Chinese 
domestic emissions were in the production of exports. 
While calculating the emission of a country, the focus 
should be on consumption emission, which takes into 
account of the emission transfer from China to developed 
countries, rather than simply on production emission. 
Developed countries have the obligation to own up to 
these consumption emissions. The need for low price 
goods from China must coordinate with the responsibility 
to admit emissions along with the cheap products. 
Reprobating China in negotiations could do nothing but 
hamper the climate justice.
Injustice China encounters under Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM).
Since its inception, the clean development mechanism 
(CDM) under Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol was 
designed to meet multiple objectives. Through clean 
development mechanism, governments or firms in 
developed countries can participate in the financing of 
projects that reduce six kinds of greenhouse gas emissions 
in developing countries in exchange for certified emission 
reductions (CERs) credits that they can use against their 
targets (Lecocq & Ambrosi, 2007). As a result, CDM 
can achieve both the targets of assisting developing 
countries to promote low-carbon economy and sustainable 
development, as well as helping developed countries 
to fulfill their commitments to reduce emissions by 
minimizing the costs. 
Admittedly, the vision of CDM is noble and it is 
beneficial to developing countries by stimulating the 
technology transfer, improving the energy efficiency 
and diminishing the harmful effect of climate change. 
However, the benefits distribution is uneven among 
developed nations and developing countries. Considering 
the low investment and high returns of the project 
financing by chemical gas manufacturers in developed 
countries, CDM seems bring less benefits to China.
First, technology transfer, which makes CDM 
appealing to China, didnot really works as well as 
expectation. Initially, the introduction of energy-saving 
technology under CDM is supposed to be a precious 
opportunity for China to upgrade its industrial structure, 
reduce its heavy dependence on fossil fuels and develop 
low carbon economy. However, most credits issued in 
China come from the trifluoromethane (HFC-23) and 
nitrous oxide (N2O) offset projects. Stanford University 
Professor Michael Wara has calculated that whereas 
installing the simple technology to pay producers to 
capture and destroy HFC-23 in the facilities covered by 
the CDM will cost $100 million, these same projects 
are expected to generate $4.7 billion CDM credits by 
2012 (Michael, 2007). It is simply because one tones 
of HFC-23 is equivalent to 11,700 tonnes of carbon 
dioxides and indirectly equivalent to 11,700 CERs 
(Frank & Philippe, 2007). The effect of N2O credits 
goes with the same rationale. These two offset projects 
can easily achieve large amount of emissions reduction 
and correspondingly gain numerous CERs by cheap gas 
scrubbers with little technology advancement, low costs 
and low risks. Comparatively speaking, there are seldom 
projects with reduction difficulty, high costs and high 
technology demand, which make it tough for China to 
learn the cutting-edge technology in the era of low carbon 
economy. The absence of high-value technology transfer 
will result in inequality under CDM and threaten China’s 
economic security. 
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Second, another problem arise with the failure to 
introduce high-value technology is the loss of easy-
reduction resource. If all projects developed countries 
invested are characterized by low cost, simple technology 
and plentiful CERs-producing, the available easy 
emissions reduction areas will be greatly narrowed down. 
Once China is forced to accept the quantified reduction 
target and fulfill compulsory emissions reduction 
responsibility in post-Kyoto era, the areas China could 
enter are limited to high investment, high technology 
demand and scarcely CERs-producing ones. Without 
effective technology transfer from developed countries, 
it will take long time for China to master the energy-
saving and efficient-improving technology on its own. 
Although it is beneficial to develop one’s own technology 
to mitigate the emissions in the long term, these high-
demanding offset projects will be a fiscal burden to China 
and will slow down the economic development speed of 
China before China owns the state-of-art technology. 
Third, although China captured nearly two-thirds 
of the market for project-based transactions (Frank 
& Philippe, 2007), China fails to manage to set the 
price for the CERs it provides in the secondary carbon 
market, where the CERs transaction prices are largely 
determined by the pricing in the Chicago Climate 
Exchange and the European Climate Exchange. Lack of 
sound domestic carbon-trading mechanism, language 
barriers, unfamiliarity about CDM procedures and 
limited knowledge about carbon finance give China no 
alternatives but to passively accept the low price of CER 
offered by major buyers, rather than voluntarily trade 
through climate exchange. According to International 
Energy Agency (IEA), the transactions in global carbon 
market amounted to $126 billion. In the drastic contrast, 
the transactions concerning China only amounts to $54 
billion, accounting for 4.27% of the global carbon market. 
The little money China de facto gains from CDM and the 
large amount of CERs it provides are exaggeratedly out of 
proportion. The price difference between primary carbon 
market and secondary carbon market leads to great carbon 
asset loss in China.
Under CDM, the benefits China receives are not as 
much as developed countries receive. China does not 
get the cutting-edge energy saving technology through 
technology transfer. In the mean time, loss of the ease-
reducing emissions offset projects will magnify the 
difficulty of China to shoulder the future mitigation 
responsibility. Besides, failure to own the ability to 
influence the price-setting in global carbon transaction 
market results in huge monetary loss of China. All these 
inequality originating from CDM are against Chinese 
economic justice.
CONCLUSIONS 
The UN climate change negotiating process is definitely 
not simply “environmental”. Although it brings most 
countries in the world together to defend against the 
threat of climate change, it is also an arena where every 
country wants to maximize their economic and political 
benefits. As a result, the notions of economic justice will 
be greatly influenced by this climate negotiation game. 
In the fundamental debate of climate negotiations, China 
is criticized for its large amount of GHG emissions this 
decade; however, these criticisms have a substantial 
impact against the China right to develop. To do so will 
violate China’s naturally unalienable right to economic 
development as developed countries did in the Industrial 
Revolution Period. Poverty eradication and internal 
energy security are a top priority for China in the next 
60 years. What is more, the large amount of GHG 
emissions in China can be attributed to its export to other 
countries in the world. As the ‘world workshop’ for most 
developed countries in the world, the emission transfers 
along the offshoring manufacturing line are numerous 
and it is unfair to only take count of the production 
emissions instead of consumption emissions. Finally, 
CDM did not bring equal benefits to developed countries 
and China. China does not get the cutting edge energy 
saving technology through technology transfer, lose 
the ease-reducing emissions offset projects and fails to 
own the ability to influence the price-setting in global 
carbon transaction market as the largest CERs provider. 
However, despite all the economic justice China faces, it 
shows great willingness to carve out a road of low carbon 
development. 
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